Political Science link with English Essay Example for Free

Political Science link with English Essay Abstract The main purpose of this paper is to provide the reader a clear understanding on the political views on estrangement. This will further be discussed by comparing and also contrasting the different views of Aristotle and Hobbe. And how might each of these philosophers have analyzed the problems on Pitcairn Island. Political Science link with English It is very common to all of us that when we decide on something, we sometimes immediately knew what we would prefer or choice and then we decide from it. This is common in the sense that every one of us has our own personal judgment, even sometimes we have the same decision with others, but the reason why we have decided it is different from that person. But, there are still other people that just tend to follow decisions and would not anymore would want to expand his mind in thinking why he needs to decide ion such things, but in fact we all been given that luxury of making up our mind on the decisions we want to have. This is also part of the key areas that will be focus on in this paper the political vision of estrangement. This will be further be discussed and explained in this paper through the different views of two famous philosophers: Aristotle and Hobbe. These two well respected philosophers will provide their own views which will eventually the basis of what was used at in the present. Lastly, these two philosophers will also be presented in this paper on how they have analyzed the problem in the Pitcairn Island. Estrangement just like a choice or decision refers to disunity due to following of different ideology. In true human reflection, this usually happens in politics, where there is always disunity that is happening. One for the administration and the other is for the opposition, or it can also be divided into majority group and the minority group. Estrangement is very evident and was said to be beneficial in an organization because this is the only way that it strikes the balance. Balance that would help like for example the government through disagreements made by the different sector of government. Or public upheaval that was initiated due to certain idea and belief that no balance of attention is given to staffs or employees in a company instead what happened was favoritism and lack of respect to others. Estrangement actually may not be present to humans, only if we have leaders who will stand for peace and equal rights across all groups, but this remains to be an ideal vision only and still people tends to work his own liberated way of thinking and pursue on what he or she desires. Take for instance people that are successful, even though they succeeded in life they lack relationship and that starts for finding somebody to compensate the sadness. Then this results to separation from the main ideology of the family. For the English philosopher, Hobbe, estrangement has a lot to do with human life, in the sense that every man is against other man, there are no central government that overrules this ideology and man should not find luxury instead grief in keeping company. Life is such a state which was considered a famous political theory that man should know his state and act on it. For Hobbe, there are two main levels of estrangement: the first level and that refers to the surface is psychological, which means that humans are estranged because they have egos to feed in and this is because they always think that they have to preserved their lives more and always the most important one. The second one is prestige and wealth and this may not be possible to achieve without practicing power. This is the most common standard of human life that every one of us will do anything just to succeed in what we do. But this also creates a person to be more selfish and self-centered. (Adler, Ronald and Russell, Proctor II, 2006, pp. 23-27). For Aristotle, it was an opposing view of Hobbe, and he said that human beings are essentially united. As the founder of political science, he made this belief more popular these days than that of Hobee. That there are more progress and developments that can happen if people work together as one. He even considered during the emergence of the city-state in the Greece, he finds views that for humans not considering in the involvement of exchanging ideas and beliefs are only those who can classifies themselves either Gods or beast. He even strongly stated that regardless of your status in the society, like slave, laborers or artisans, you can still allow to unite with different groups since you also bear the same ideology and principle. This principle or belief was then been carried on for years and it was very beneficial in war as people can easily know the greater importance of unity instead of working individually. (Adler, Ronald and Russell, Proctor II, 2006, pp. 28-29). But the main focal point is that does human beings are estranged in essence. Based on the two philosophers, it is hard to mention what is more effective; instead it is more on the faith of the individual that counts the most. That is contrasting the two different ideology has its own personal purpose, humans should strike the balance. In other words both have its own main advantage provided it will be used appropriately. In the Pitcairn Island novel, it was obviously a cast of different personality at the beginning, most specially for Christian, who always finds it interesting working alone but still effectively contributing to the team. Unlike McCoy, Smith, John and Martin, preferred more to work as a team and having to work in a more focus but more collaborative way is essential. In this novel, following Aristotle’s ideology would be easier, it was shown here that even after a little uprising happens that divides the followers, still there are loyal followers that remains and still succeeded in reaching its goal in arriving to Pitcairn Island. Unlike for Hobbe’s ideology it can still be helpful but instead of addressing the team as one, what he will do is to work each and every member and that will take much of his time and the time for his team to coordinate at one another, even though a higher efficiency for each individual will be achieved but the team work will suffer and in that time that is more important as there was already an uprising that happens. This is truly a call for leadership and unity for the team in the ship. The only used for Hobbe’s principle is for its leader of the ship, which he needs to look more on how he can find and implement rules more effectively and from there is that to establish the principle of Aristotle’s unity in achieving the over-all vision of the team. (Nordhoff, Charles and Hall, James Norman. (Nordhoff, Charles and Hall, James Norman, 1962, pp. 3-71). Work Cited Page Adler, Ronald and Russell, Proctor II. Looking Out, Looking In., US: Wadsworth Publishing, 2006. Nordhoff, Charles and Hall, James Norman. Pitcairn Island., Boston, USA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1962. Work Cited Bassman, E. (1992). Abuse in the Workplace: Management Remedies and Bottom Line Impact. Westport, CT: Stourum Press, 1992.

Difficulties of Cost Control in Construction Industry

Difficulties of Cost Control in Construction Industry CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1.1 Problem Statement: In every industry, cost control is a must in order to make sure that a project or production can make maximum profit or to make sure that the budget of a project does not burst. Locally, the actual costs of development of a project will normally being higher than necessary. In order to have an effective cost control in construction industry, it is necessary for us to determine the difficulties of cost control and to identify the factors contribute to the cost control difficulties in a project in order to overcome the difficulties or to avoid those factors that may cause difficulties to cost control of a construction project during construction stage, thus to have an effective cost control for the construction project and complete the project within the budget or under budget. 1.2 Aim and Objective: The aim of this paper is to study the difficulties of cost control in construction industry during the construction stage. In order to achieve the study of aim, some objectives have been established as below: To ascertain the importance of applying cost control in local construction industry. To highlight the cost control difficulties in local construction firm during the construction stage. To investigate the factors contributing to cost control difficulties in local construction firm during construction stage. 1.3 Background: Cost control is a process that should be continued throughout the project life cycle of a project. In construction industry, cost control should be continued from the inception of the project until the completion of the project to ensure that the cost of the construction project is kept within the agreed cost limits. For cost control of construction industry, it can be divided into two major stages; the control of cost during design stages and the control of cost by construction firm right after the commencement of the construction work of the construction project. According to Ashworth (2004), cost and schedule control is one of the most important functions of management once a project is identified. Cost control is paramount during the feasibility and design phases because a projects feasibility is normally tied to the cost of a project. Besides that, cost control during the construction phase can be paramount for large projects due to their potentially high construction cost and profiles. As mentioned by Nunnally (1998), the measuring and collecting the cost record of a project and the work progress are included in the cost control of a project. Besides that, the comparison of actual progress with the planning is also involved. The main purpose of cost control of a project is to gain maximum profit within the designated period and satisfactory quality of work. According to Pilcher (1994), he defined cost control as the regulation, by executive action, of the cost of carrying out the various activities which go to make up a project or a contract. The regulation (for cost control) designed for a specific industry will need a major modification if it is used in other industry because of the different nature or the business. He also said that for all construction projects, costs must be controlled and monitored from all the parties involved including client, consultants and contractor. This study will mainly focus on the difficulties of applying cost control during construction stage. That is because of in my opinion, what is needed in a cost control methodology is to proactively seeks out potential difficulties and factors contributed to those difficulties and provides project managers with as much warning as possible before their occurrence. This study provides a milestone for construction firm in the factors that likely to causes the difficulty in cost control. 1.4 Scope of Study: Cost Control is commonly used in every industry and almost in every project, the study will only focused on cost control difficulties of construction industry or a construction project during the construction stage. This study will ascertain the importance and the use of applying cost control in local construction industry. Besides that, the difficulties in applying cost control during construction stage also falls within the scope of this study. After highlighting the difficulties theoretically, an interview will be conducted with experienced Contract Executive or Contact Manager or Project Manager to determine the difficulties of cost control during construction stage practically. Finally, after understanding the difficulties of cost control during construction stage, the factors contributing to cost control difficulties during construction stage will also be highlighted. 1.5 Research Methodology The study is conducting in three stages. First stage is literature review. The literature review will started with the introduction to cost control. In the introduction to cost control, the definition of cost control will be reviewed and the literature will also review the importance of cost control in construction industry. Moreover, the literature also will review the difficulties of applying cost control during construction stage. Furthermore, articles and notes about the cost control difficulties will be searched. All literature will be review deeply by referring the previous research paper, article, journal and etc. These sources can all be found in Google, Emerald, Yahoo and from the library of College Tunku Abdul Rahman. At second stage, an interview will be conducted with experienced Contract Executive or Contracts Manager or Project Manager face-to-face to obtain the information about their current practices in cost control system of their company, the practical difficulties and factors contributing to the difficulties in cost control will be identified by the Contract Executive or Contract Manager or Project Manager. The chosen Contract Executive or Contract Manager or Project Manager must be experienced enough in cost management of construction industry and willing to provide valuable information regarding the research topic. Last stage is writing up the content of the dissertation and the information obtained during the interview will be analyse and compare with the theoretical information. Conclusion of this study should be the result of the comparison between the practical and theoretical difficulties during cost control of construction stage faced by the contractor. 1.6 Benefits of Study By conducting this study, it allows me to have a rough idea on the Cost Control system. Completing this study also gives me a better understanding regarding the purposes and importance of Cost Control. Besides that, it also provides me with better perception regarding the difficulties during the application of Cost Control during construction stage. Furthermore, the interview conducted with the experienced Personnel will definitely allow me to review the current practices of Cost Control in the construction industry. 1.7 Dissertation Organisation Chapter 1: Introduction Chapter 2: Cost Control Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology Chapter 4: Analysis of the Result and Discussion Chapter 5: Conclusion CHAPTER 2: COST CONTROL 2.1 Introduction to Cost Control 2.1.1 Definition The term Cost is defined by Dictionary.com (an application of iPod Touch) as the price paid to acquire, produce, accomplish, or maintain anything. Whereas the term Control in Dictionary.com, it defines Control as the act or power of controlling; regulation; domination or command. For construction industry, the term Cost should be referred to the amount paid by a party; either a person or a corporation, to another party; normally a contractor, either to construct a complete building or a particular section of a building. And for the term Control in construction industry, it should be referred to an official mean of regulation or restraint in the management of the project. According to Marchesan and Formoso (n. d.), the combination of the term Cost and Control should be defined as the application of procedures that result in early illumination of potential changes in resource requirements and in the timely surveillance of the usage of funds to permit action that will keep cost within a predetermined range. While for the other definition of Cost Control, we can refer to Ashworth (2004), he defined Cost Control as a process of planning, checking and verifying project expenditure based on established standards and taking the necessary corrective action to ensure that the total project expenditure is approximately to the estimated budget. While according to Ritz (1994), he stated that Cost Control gives a different meaning to a different people. Some people engage it with engineering costs; some states that it is a cost report, value engineering, cost management etc. Cost Control involves all the activities above in different time by different parties and all the parties involved in a project will have their own responsibilities and roles in cost minimization and Cost Control. Other than that, Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyor Committee defined Cost Control as the total proves which ensures that the contract sum is within the clients approved budget or cost limit. Further definition can refer to Mueller (1986), he stated that the cost control is the ability to influence the final cost of project positively with modifying negative performance trends. In addition, Kwayke (1997) defined Cost Control as a process where construction cost of a project is manage with the best method and systematic approach in order that the contractor would not suffer losses during the execution of the activities of the project and the cost of construction of a project would not be over-estimated by the developer. By concluding all the definition mentioned above, Cost Control in construction industry should be the application of procedures or regulation during the construction project life cycle to plan, check and verify the construction project expenditure based on the established procedures or regulations to ensure that the construction project expenditure is within the project budget, within given timeframe with quality specified and also to ensure that resources are used to best advantages or maximization of the profit for the construction project. 2.1.2 Statement of Facts in Cost Control As stated by Roger (2000), he said that Cost Control is a broad set of cost accounting methods and management techniques with the common goal of improving business cost-efficiency by reducing costs, or at least restricting their rate of growth. Cost Control is used in business to monitor, evaluate and the most important to increase the efficiency of specific areas within their operations. As for Nunnally (1998), he stated that cost control of a project involves measuring and collecting cost record and work progress of a project. Besides that, comparison of actual progress with the planning is also involved. He also mentioned that the main objective of Cost Control of a project is to maximize profit within the given timeframe and to achieve satisfactory quality of work. If the application of cost control is by a systematic procedure, it will result in ease of collection of important cost data in estimating and controlling of the cost of the coming projects in future. Kwakye (1997) states the main purpose in cost controlling for a construction project should be active controlling of final costs for owner, and not just to record and registering the payment. Cost Control Reports must be prepared for efficient Cost Control. The Cost Control Report is based on the cost data collected, it is important to project the costs in to future and to estimate or re-estimate the cost of the work yet to be completed. Amount of detail and the time interval between Cost Control Reports must be considered and the time interval is varied depends on the level of management for which they prepared the Reports for. For example, Cost Report should be received by site manager on weekly basis. Since the commencement of the contract, any new information must be taken into account and makes a suitable reporting system is important for a cost control system. According to Koh (2005), if an adequate reporting system is used, the estimator would become more reluctant in the future to use cost data that have been fed back from the site and granting the estimator some time to determine sufficient detail about the data and conditions they acquired. In addition, Koh (2005) also suggested two areas to check whether the Cost Control reporting system is efficient or not. First is to check on the profitability of the work and second would be check on efficiency carried out against the standard of the output rates that were used by the estimator in compiling the estimate. 2.1.3 The Purposes and Importance of Cost Control One of the principal objectives of Cost Control for most project or organisation is the achievement of minimum cost for a particular project. Achievement of minimum cost is to maximize the profit and profit in simple terms is what is left after all the income accruing to the enterprise has been received and all of the costs or outgoings have been paid. For all construction projects, cost must be monitored and controlled, whether from the point of view of owner, designer or a contractor. It helps to distinguish the problems arise and understanding of the problems which occur in each phase of industry enables better co-ordination of the activities of the many participants in a single project (Pilcher, 1994). Besides that, according to Pilcher (1994), the importance of Cost Control is due largely to the following: To provide the relevant feedback, carefully qualified in detail by all the conditions under which the work has been carried out, to the estimator who is responsible for establishing the standards both historical and future; To provide the client with a value-for-money project. Example: To give the building client a building which is soundly constructed, of satisfactory appearance and well suited to perform the functions for which it is required, combined with economical construction layout. To provide data to assist in the valuation of those variations that will arise during the course of the work; To provide immediate warning of uneconomic operations, both in the long and the short term; To limit the clients expenditure to within the amount agreed. In simple terms this means that the tender sum and final account should approximately equate with the budget estimate. To achieve balanced design expenditure between the various elements of the buildings. Thus, the sums allocated to cladding, insulation, finishing, services and other elements of the building will be properly related to the class of building and to each other. To summarize progress. To promote cost consciousness; The contractor may ascertain the maximum income that they may receive according to the contract sum, then ascertain the initial cost expenditure, or provide detailed brief to his own construction team who will then determine the actual cost that may involved. But most schemes are a combination of these two extremes. There has in recent years been a great need for an understanding of construction economics and Cost Control, particularly during the construction stage of projects. As stated by Ashworth (2004), Cost Control also should serve the following purposes: The clients requirements today are more complex, a more effective system of control is therefore desirable during the construction stage up to the completion of final account and thereafter during costs-in-use. There has been a trend towards modern designs and new techniques, materials and methods of construction. The designer is able to choose from a far wider range of products and this has produced variety in construction. The traditional methods of estimating are unable to cope in these circumstances to achieve value for money and more balanced designs resulting that in the end the contractor may need to bear for extra cost due to the faulty design. Contractors profit margins have in real terms been reduced considerably during the past decade. This has resulted in their greater cost-consciousness in an attempt to redress possible losses. There is a general trend towards greater cost-effectiveness, and thus a need to examine construction costs not solely in the context of initial costs but in terms of whole-life costs, or total-cost appraisal. World recession has generally produced a shortage of funds for capital purposes and construction in general. This has been coupled with high inflation and interest charges, resulting in the costs of construction soaring to high levels. Although the relative costs compared with other commodities may be similar, the apparent high costs have resulted in greater caution, particularly on the part of contractor. 2.2 Difficulties of Applying Cost Control Procedures At present, serious problems exist in the cost control and management of construction project. For example, for some construction project, the design is earlier than the study of feasibility, which makes the later turn into useless. In bidding, some construction companies perform illegally, which makes the bidding fail to control project cost well. The popularization of assigned subcontracts and various subcontracts serve as potential threats for project quality. The delay for project payment, especially for workers wages, is serious. Some projects can not manage the changes of designs, construction companies fail to follow the designs completely, which may lead to larger costs for construction. Some construction companies emphasize on the control of quality and period but fail to control the cost. All these activities make the cost of construction project out of control in our country, which is harmful for the sustainable and healthy development of construction industry. Gao (2009) has stated that the following is the difficulties in Cost Control of construction stage. 2.2.1 Fail to Estimate the Project Exactly The project estimation is performed at the very beginning, namely in the study of feasibility. Present compilation of study of feasibility is lack of details. No effective items to control the number of project. The estimation has a lower preciseness. Besides, the study of feasibility has no necessary investigation. Some potential geological disasters can not be identified effectively, which leads to the rise of costs. Although some companies make details for implement, the effect is poor. In order to establish the project, some companies may reduce the number of project and decrease costs. 2.2.2 The Compilation of Project Budget Has Poor Reliability At the stage of design, the investigation is far from sufficient. Some fundamental materials for design are inexact. As a result, the design may be irrational and will be changed significantly in construction, which causes the poor reliability of budget. 2.2.3 Working Drawing Budget is Unpractical At the working drawing design stage, compile the project budget according to the design. The working drawing budget is to calculate the cost of design. The rationality of working drawing budget is about how to organize the construction and how to reach the design requirements by what kinds of methods, plus how to arrange the construction period, and how to manage workers and machines under different seasons, according to scientific designs. All these tasks are supposed to be arranged by construction companies. For design companies, to compile the budget is unpractical. 2.2.4 Do not Follow Basic Construction Procedures and Can not Control Costs For some projects, time is urgent. Therefore, the design is maybe imperfect. And the construction does not follow the basic procedures strictly. Sometimes, the study of feasibility turns into useless papers. As a result, the estimation and the budget can not control the project cost effectively. 2.2.5 Contract is not Managed Well Some developers neglect to manage contracts. They do not follow the terms written in contracts strictly. Besides, some developers can not calculate the cost of project quantities correctly. They are incapable of managing external workers effectively. 2.2.6 Irregular Management and Many Changes for Project Developers can not design properly and have to change the management methods. Or, the execution is weak. They can change the design as will. Then, the scale of project is increasing and the cost is rising. 2.2.7 Rise of Cost Due to Unreasonable Financing Structure At present, the funds for construction project in Malaysia are mainly from domestic loans, foreign funds, self-collected by construction companies, and other sources. Although financing ways are few and some are immature, limits are more. Sometimes, funds can not arrive in time. In order to insure the process of project, the construction companies have to apply loans from banks. Therefore, a large proportion of construction funds are from banks as loans. And the credit period is long and can not match with investment return. The characteristics of construction industry determine the lagged-behind investment return. One financing channel increases risks and costs, which leads to the accumulation of loan balance in banks, increasing construction costs and pressures for later in operation. 2.2.8 System is imperfect One of the factors that cause overspending is the management. Main items that cause overspending include management fees, compensation fees for removing, and supervision. Main reasons include: Lack of a perfect cost control system and can not manage and control the cost systematically, which makes it hard to identify the out-of-control of cost in time. Lack the idea of cost control and the constraint mechanism. Project managers are always focusing on quality and construction period, but not cost control. The absence of system makes the expenditure more irregular. No integrated standards for management fee are effective. Workers are more than necessary in construction companies. 2.3 Factors Contributing to the Difficulties of Cost Control 2.3.1 Control of labour cost The control of labour cost frequently causing much troubles to Cost Control because of the productivity of labour is variable and causing the difficulty to the estimating stage. Although experienced estimators have their own database of historic cost data, but these data can only ever be regarded as an average for a given trade and does not make allowance for particular circumstances. A prediction of how labour will perform in the future on a particular project must be incorporated into an estimate of cost. Site management is greatly affecting the labour efficiency and their productivity. It is important that all labour resources, either self-employed or employed as labour and materials sub-contractors, are fully supervised and co-ordinated, to ensure that the labour resources are efficiently organized and making best used of them. If the labour resources are not well organized, it may reduce the productivity of the labour and making cost of labour to be higher hence causing difficulties to Cost Control because the labour cost is different with the estimated cost. 2.3.2 Site Condition After the design of engineer, quantity surveyor will normally estimate the amount of the designed work, but due to the site condition is unpredictable, it cause the cost estimation is rather difficult. In many of the construction project, there are majority of unforeseen and differing site condition are found in subsurface work such as tunneling and foundation work, such situation can also arise in rehabilitation and restoration work, retrofitting to meet revised seismic codes and projects that improve energy efficiency. Where ground water level is close to the surface of the site, closely pumping operation may be needed throughout the substructure work. This unforeseen situation will increase the construction cost. A wet site may also involve raising temporary sheds and offices on brick bases and more costly temporary work. The cost of excavation in rock is much more expensive than working in normal ground. This type of strata will need to be examined and to determine what type of support is needed to the sides of excavation. All this will contribute to the difficulty in cost control when the construction method is carried out wrongly. 2.3.3 Location of site The cost of building on a site in a city could be much expensive than construct a similar building on a provincial site. This is due to higher wages, materials and other costs. For instance, a project on a remote location site may involve long lengths of temporary access road and of temporary power cable for electricity suppliers and increased costs of transporting operatives and materials to the site. A site in a congested central area of a city will give rise to major problem in delivery and storage of materials and equipment, protection of adjoining building, construction method to carry out substructure work, restriction on the use of mechanical plant and to the protection of the public. Overcoming these problem involve considerable additional cost and all these will considerably contribute to the difficulty in cost control. 2.3.4 Materials In some of the guides the cost of materials can be easily identified, and adjustment to the measured rate is therefore a simple process. Material prices often depend on contractor, location, quantity and discount and hence making the estimation process to be rather difficult. The materials wastage of site will also contribute to this because there will be difference between the actual amount used and the estimated amount used. 2.3.5 Overheads and profit In most case, during the estimation process, the amount of overheads and profit will normally just referred back to previous projects. But the amounts included in the published rates vary considerably. In some guides nothing has been allowed, and these expect the user to add an appropriate amount. In other information, up to 25% has been included on margins of 3%. In addition, overhead costs have generally been reduced in order to keep costs to an absolute minimum, while seeking to maintain the required workload. Builders will therefore need to access their own percentage and adjust this according to that quoted. Surveyors, in attempting to predict tender values, will also need to take this into account in their approximate estimate. 2.4 Chapter Summary Cost Control in construction industry should be the application of procedures or regulation during the construction project life cycle to plan, check and verify the construction project expenditure based on the established procedures or regulations to ensure that the construction project expenditure is within the project budget, within given timeframe with quality specified and also to ensure that resources are used to best advantages or maximization of the profit for the construction project. Cost Control need to serves the purposes like to provide the relevant feedback, to provide the client with a value-for-money project, to provide data to assist in the valuation, to provide immediate warning of uneconomic operations, to limit the clients expenditure, to achieve balanced design expenditure, to summarize progress and to promote cost consciousness. Difficulties of Cost Control during construction stage are failed to estimate the project exactly, the compilation of project budget has poor reliability, working drawing budget is unpractical, do not follow basic construction procedures and can not control costs, contract is not managed well, irregular management and many changes for project, rise of cost due to unreasonable financing structure and system is imperfect. Factors that contribute to those difficulties are control of labour cost, site Condition, location of site, materials and overheads and profit. It is necessary for management to study the difficulties involved and the factors contributing to these difficulties so that they will design a cost control system that more efficient for a particular project. Chapter 3: Research design and methodology 3.1 Introduction In this chapter, the research methodology used in this research will be discussed. The method of conducting research to achieve the aim and objectives will be reviewed to ensure that all the information obtained is reliable. Among two research strategies that suggested by Naoum (2007), which is Quantitative Research and Qualitative Research, Qualitative Research will be used as the research strategy for this dissertation. The reason to use Qualitative Research is because of it allows the topic being studied to give much valuable answers to questions put to them. Structured interview will be conducted with at least five (5) contractors so that sufficient information can be obtained to proceed with the field work. The interview will be carried out face to face with the interviewee, however, it also may be carried out over the telephone or any other methods like email or webcam. The targeted personnel to be interviewed are contract executive, contract manager or the project manager of the company. Since it is a structured interview, the questions to be asked are presented in the same order and with the same wording to all interviewees. The main objectives of this interview section are to clearly understand the ability of the contractor in cost control and the difficulties that they are dealing with during cost control of project they undertake. While the other objectives are to ascertain the importance of cost control during construction stage with the contractor and last but not least to investigate the factors that contribute to difficulties that they are dealing with during cost control. The interviewing session has the advantage of providing experience or opinion based information for the dissertation. Questions prepared are open- ended questions for the interview so that in-depth information can be collected. The questions are set by referring to the aim and objectives, data obtained will be of the opinions and perception as individual interviewee knowledge and experience of research area. 3.2 Questionnaire Construction The principles that are followed in constructing the questionnaire for the research are as shown in Figures 3.1 below: Research objectives + Literature review Questions Lead to Lead to Issues, topics and ideas Principles on how research objectives are translated into specific questions. (Naoum, 2007) Before constructing the questionnaire, the potential ideas which can be developed into a questionnaire at a later stage are listed out. In order to have the ideas to develop into questionnaire, the research proposal and the literature review is reviewed and all possible questions which are related to the research is written down to obtained the first thought questions. Those listed out question are all based on the aim and objectives of the research. After the first thought questions have been identified, the final questionnaire is constructed by introducing a number of section or categories for the questionnaire and the first thought questions are fitted into these sections. The research questionnaire was divided into two sections in which the first section is to obtain the back ground and information of the interviewees as well as their organization. This is to ensur

An Unnatural Family as the Punishment for Sin in Hawthornes Scarlet Le

In an introductory paragraph to Nathaniel Hawthorne’s works, Perkins and Perkins say that â€Å"Hawthorne elevated some of the darkest events of the colonial period and transformed them into universal themes and questions†(Perkins 433). One of these themes is that of the penalty of sin. In Romans 6:23, Paul says that â€Å"the wages of sin is death† and Hawthorne seems to share this view, or at least some version of it. This view is prevalent in his novel The Scarlet Letter. In it, the penalty for Hester Prynne and Arthur Dimmesdale’s sin is a family that is disfigured and unnatural. Dimmesdale, the â€Å"father† in this family shies away from his patriarchal duties and stands by while he lets Hester do all of the work regarding Pearl. First of all, Dimmesdale is absent for the majority of Pearl’s life. He is present in the town but hardly ever sees Pearl, even though she is his daughter. He says that Pearl has, only â€Å"twice in her little lifetime† shown kindness to him(Hawthorne Ch.19). Out of seven entire years, Dimmesdale and Pearl have shared only two meaningful moments together. Dimmesdale has obviously shied away from his duties as a father to Pearl. Even though she is illegitimate, it is his responsibility to help raise her. He also does not deal with Pearl directly when she is acting like a crazed animal. He implores Hester to calm her, telling Hester to â€Å"pacify her,† through any means to show him â€Å"if thou lovest me!†(Hawthorne Ch. 19). Hawthorne uses specific images through the words of his characters to show how much Dimmesdale is shying away from his responsibilities as a father. As a father, Dimmesdale should be raising his child to become a contributing member of the Puritan society in Massachusetts. Instead of doing this, Dimmesd... ..., but this is exactly what Pearl does over both Hester and Dimmesdale. Clearly, during the forest scene, Hawthorne is giving the reader a sense of how unnatural this family that came from a single adulterous act is. It sheds light on Hawthorne’s romantic views because it shows how an unnatural family is detestable. In a much more broad sense, it gives the reader a glimpse of Hawthorne’s own personal theology. He firmly believes in severe consequences for sin and it shows in his novel. Works Cited Hawthorne, Nathaniel. The Scarlet Letter. 1850. New York: Bantam Dell, 2003. Print Perkins, George, and Barbara Perkins. â€Å"Nathaniel Hawthorne.† The American Tradition in Literature. Ed. Perkins and Perkins. 12th ed. Concise ed. Boston: McGraw Hill, 2007. 433-36. Print. The Holy Bible: New International Version. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 1996. Print.

Robert Frost Biography :: essays research papers

Robert Lee Frost, born in San Francisco, California on March 26th 1874 was named after Robert E. Lee, the commander for the Confederate armies during the American Civil War. He’s an American poet, who drew his images from t he New England countryside and his language from New England speech. Although his images and voice often seem familiar and old, his observations have an edge of skepticism and irony that makes his work, never as old-fashioned, easy, or carefree as it appears. He was one of America’s leading 20th century poets and a four-time winner of the Pulitzer Prize.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  After his father’s death of tuberculosis in 1885, when young Frost was 11, the family left California and settled in Massachusetts. Frost attended high school there, entered Dartmouth College, but remained less than one semester. Returning to Massachusetts, he taught school and worked in a mill and as a newspaper reporter. A year later he married Elinor White, with whom he had shared valedictorian honors at Lawrence High School. From 1897 to 1899, he attended Harvard College as a special student but left without a degree. In 1912, at the age of 38, he sold the farm and used the proceeds to take his family to England, where he could devote himself entirely to writing. His efforts to establish himself and his work were almost immediately successful. A Boy’s Will was accepted by a London publisher and brought out in 1913, followed a year later by North of Boston. Favorable reviews on both sides of the Atlantic resulted in American publication of the books by Henry Holt and Company, Frost’s primary American publisher, and in the establishing of Frost’s transatlantic reputation. Much of his poetry is concerned with how people interact with their environment, and though he saw the beauty of nature, he also saw its potential dangers. Frost disliked free verse, which was popular with many writers of his time, and instead used traditional metrical and rhythmical schemes. He often wrote in the standard meter of blank verse, but ran sentences over several lines so that the poetic meter plays subtly under the rhythms of natural speech. Frost listened to the speech in his country world north of Boston, and he recorded it. He had what he called â€Å"The ruling passion in man †¦ a gregarious instinct to keep together by minding each other’s business.† Frost continued to mind his neighbors’ speech and business in his volume Mountain Interval (1916), which included the poems â€Å"The Road Not Taken†, â€Å"An Old Man’s Winter Night†, â€Å"Birches† and more.

Use of Imagery in Daddy by Sylvia Plath Essay -- Poetry Analysis

As a modern female poet, Sylvia Plath played many roles in her art: she was the fragile feminist, the confessional writer, the literary innovator. As a woman, Plath found herself with one foot in her past and the other in an uncertain future, her present an often uncomfortable combination of the two. She was at once a daughter desperate to make her parents proud and a wife eager to please her husband; an overworked, depressed teenager and a lonely, sick mother; a child who lost her father and an adult who lost her hope. Plath’s confusion between her memories and her fantasies produced the creative inspiration that spawned much of her work; the losses she suffered had the same effect. The death of her father became a theme in her poetry on which Plath would often spin her words. In the poem â€Å"Daddy,† Plath uses imagery to compare her father to a shoe, God and a vampire, to establish similarities between her father and her husband and to describe the lack of communica tion between her and her father. â€Å"You do not do, you do not do/Anymore, black shoe,† proclaims Plath in the opening lines of â€Å"Daddy† (222), introducing the world to her father, ominous in the color black and consistent in his inability to â€Å"do† anything for Plath â€Å"anymore.† This depiction of the father as an shoe instead of a man also presents Plath’s deft use of imagery to color the character of her father, this time with the shade of a black shoe. This image makes the father sound â€Å"stifling† (â€Å"Slayer† 1). The imagery of the black shoe is also powerful in explaining the nature of Plath’s posthumous relationship with her father. Shoes usually protect the foot, provide warmth for it (Goelzhaeuser 1). Shoes in the poem, however, do not invoke the sheltering, caring ... ...ountry. However, it seems likely that she died as she lived, haunted by a combination of the two, her deceased father pointing out her failures from far away in her childhood and her substitute husband becoming another one of those failures from another woman’s apartment. The imagery of â€Å"Daddy,† of her father and her husband, each her protector and her abuser in one, stands a testament of words to just that. Works Cited Barnard, Caroline King. Sylvia Plath. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1978. Goelzhauser, Nicola. â€Å"Imagery in Sylvia Plath’s ‘Daddy.’† Online. http://www.geocities.com/SoHo/Studios/8984/daddy.htm. â€Å"Oedipus Complex.† Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary. 10th ed. 1993. Plath, Sylvia. The Collected Poems. Ed. Ted Hughes. NewYork: Harper Perennial, 1972. â€Å"Sylvia the Vampire Slayer.† Online. http://members.aol.com/raisans/plath.htm. Use of Imagery in Daddy by Sylvia Plath Essay -- Poetry Analysis As a modern female poet, Sylvia Plath played many roles in her art: she was the fragile feminist, the confessional writer, the literary innovator. As a woman, Plath found herself with one foot in her past and the other in an uncertain future, her present an often uncomfortable combination of the two. She was at once a daughter desperate to make her parents proud and a wife eager to please her husband; an overworked, depressed teenager and a lonely, sick mother; a child who lost her father and an adult who lost her hope. Plath’s confusion between her memories and her fantasies produced the creative inspiration that spawned much of her work; the losses she suffered had the same effect. The death of her father became a theme in her poetry on which Plath would often spin her words. In the poem â€Å"Daddy,† Plath uses imagery to compare her father to a shoe, God and a vampire, to establish similarities between her father and her husband and to describe the lack of communica tion between her and her father. â€Å"You do not do, you do not do/Anymore, black shoe,† proclaims Plath in the opening lines of â€Å"Daddy† (222), introducing the world to her father, ominous in the color black and consistent in his inability to â€Å"do† anything for Plath â€Å"anymore.† This depiction of the father as an shoe instead of a man also presents Plath’s deft use of imagery to color the character of her father, this time with the shade of a black shoe. This image makes the father sound â€Å"stifling† (â€Å"Slayer† 1). The imagery of the black shoe is also powerful in explaining the nature of Plath’s posthumous relationship with her father. Shoes usually protect the foot, provide warmth for it (Goelzhaeuser 1). Shoes in the poem, however, do not invoke the sheltering, caring ... ...ountry. However, it seems likely that she died as she lived, haunted by a combination of the two, her deceased father pointing out her failures from far away in her childhood and her substitute husband becoming another one of those failures from another woman’s apartment. The imagery of â€Å"Daddy,† of her father and her husband, each her protector and her abuser in one, stands a testament of words to just that. Works Cited Barnard, Caroline King. Sylvia Plath. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1978. Goelzhauser, Nicola. â€Å"Imagery in Sylvia Plath’s ‘Daddy.’† Online. http://www.geocities.com/SoHo/Studios/8984/daddy.htm. â€Å"Oedipus Complex.† Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary. 10th ed. 1993. Plath, Sylvia. The Collected Poems. Ed. Ted Hughes. NewYork: Harper Perennial, 1972. â€Å"Sylvia the Vampire Slayer.† Online. http://members.aol.com/raisans/plath.htm.

Culture and Its Importance

Journal of Management Development Emerald Article: Do Cultural Differences Make a Business Difference? : Contextual Factors Affecting Cross-cultural Relationship Success Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Richard Ian Corn Article information: To cite this document: Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Richard Ian Corn, (1994),†Do Cultural Differences Make a Business Difference? : Contextual Factors Affecting Cross-cultural Relationship Success†, Journal of Management Development, Vol. 13 Iss: 2 pp. 5 – 23 Permanent link to this document: http://dx. oi. org/10. 1108/02621719410050219 Downloaded on: 26-10-2012 References: This document contains references to 30 other documents Citations: This document has been cited by 26 other documents To copy this document: [email  protected] com This document has been downloaded 3632 times since 2005. * Users who downloaded this Article also downloaded: * Rosabeth Moss Kanter, (2004),†The challenges of leadership: Interview with Rosabeth Moss Kanter †, Strategic Direction, Vol. 0 Iss: 6 pp. 7 – 10 http://dx. doi. org/10. 1108/02580540410533190 Rosabeth Moss Kanter, 1997†³Strategies for success in the new global economy: An interview with Rosabeth Moss Kanter†, Strategy & Leadership, Vol. 25 Iss: 6 pp. 20 – 26 http://dx. doi. org/10. 1108/eb054603 Martin E. Smith, (2003),†Changing an organisation's culture: correlates of success and failure†, Leadership & Organization Development Journal, Vol. 24 Iss: 5 pp. 249 – 261 http://dx. doi. org/10. 108/01437730310485752 Access to this document was granted through an Emerald subscription provided by UNIVERSITY OF GREENWICH For Authors: If you would like to write for this, or any other Emerald publication, then please use our Emerald for Authors service. Information about how to choose which publication to write for and submission guidelines are available for all. Please visit www. emeraldinsight. com/authors for more information. About Em erald www. emeraldinsight. om With over forty years' experience, Emerald Group Publishing is a leading independent publisher of global research with impact in business, society, public policy and education. In total, Emerald publishes over 275 journals and more than 130 book series, as well as an extensive range of online products and services. Emerald is both COUNTER 3 and TRANSFER compliant. The organization is a partner of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) and also works with Portico and the LOCKSS initiative for digital archive preservation. Related content and download information correct at time of download. Do Cultural Differences Make a Busines s Difference? Contextual Factors Affecting Cros s-cultural Relationship Succes s Rosabeth Moss Kanter and Richard Ian Corn Harvard Business School, Boston, Massachusetts, U S A I think Turks are Turks, and they are very different from Canadians, or North Americans or Brits or whatever. But when I went to Turkey, I was dealing with some Turks who had been dealing with Canadians for 10-15 years; they understood us and had adapted to our ways.Yes, they were still Turks, but they knew what Canadians expected. And they knew Canadians very well, so they forgave us when we made faux pas, they understood that we like Christmas Day off. They were patient and gave us a year to understand them. Cultural Differences 5 Canadian executive, describing experiences in his company’s joint venture in Turkey Of course, initially there were apprehensions about being bought by foreigners. Foreigners to us is anyone outside the local community.American executive, describing his company’s acquisition by a British company In Search of Cultural Differences As economies globalize and organizations increasingly form cross-border relationships, there is a resurgence of interest in the management problems caused by national cultural differences – in values, ideologies, organizational assumptions, work practices, and behavioural styles – spawning research reminiscent of national character studies following the Second World War.Recent findings about the cultural propensities of major countries appear robust, replicated in surveys of the values of managers[1-3], as well as used to explain institutional patterns within countries[4]. Such findings are often consistent with stereotypes evoked by managers to explain others and themselves. Cultural generalizations roll easily off the tongues of people in our studies. For example: several Europeans predicted problems Volvo and Renault could have in combining Volvo’s Swedish egalitarianism with Renault’s French hierarchy.A German executive working in a French-American alliance commented that Germans and Americans had more values in common than either did with the French, invoking this as an Important contributions to the case studies and interviews for this paper by Kalman Applbaum, Pamela Yatsko, Madelyn Yucht, Paul Myers, Clau dia de Dominicis, Tom Hughes, Liska Ouellette, Saba Hapte-Selassie and Thuy Tranthi are gratefully acknowledged, as is the support of the Division of Research of the Harvard Business School. Copyright 1993 by R. M. Kanter and R. I. Corn. Used by permission. Journal of Management Development, Vol. 13 No. 2, 1994 pp. 5-23. MCB University Press, 0262-1711 Journal of Management Development 13,2 6 explanation for why an American sent to London to lead the integration team was viewed as incompetent by the French partner for failing to make authoritative decisions[5]. Furthermore, people often assume cultural heterogeneity creates tensions for organizations.Managers, even within a single country, often prefer homogeneity to heterogeneity, because shared experiences and culture are a basis for trust[6]. Yet, while national cultural differences clearly exist at some level of generality, it is more difficult to specify how the presence of such differences affects organizational and managerial effectiveness. Evidence and observations in a range of situations raise questions about the usefulness of the â€Å"cultural differences† approach for managers. For example: ?When people of different national cultures interact, they can be remarkably adaptable, as in the Japanese history of borrowing practices from other countries[7]. And even though it is supposedly more difficult for managers to operate outside their home culture, multinational companies have long succeeded even when expatriate managers make mistakes. Many industrial firms have operated successfully in foreign countries while showing insensitivity towards local values or treating host-country personnel less well than home-country personnel[8]. Technical orientation can override national orientation. There is evidence that similar educational experiences – e. g. for managers or technical professionals – erase ideological differences; those within the same profession tend to espouse similar val ues regardless of nationality[9,10]. At Inmarsat, an international satellite consortium owned by companies from over 60 countries and staffed at its London headquarters by 55 nationalities, differences between functions were a greater source of conflict than differences between nationalities.Although stereotypes abounded (â€Å"Spaniards are often late†; â€Å"Indians like to talk†), engineers who shared a technical orientation quickly adjusted to each other’s foibles – easily enough that a training programme on cross-cultural management was poorly attended[11]. ? Tensions between organizations which seem to be caused by cultural differences often turn out, on closer examination, to have more significant structural causes. A Scottish construction company had difficulty in its first international partnership with a French company.The failure was widely explained by employees as caused by differences between a â€Å"beer culture† and a â€Å"wine cu lture†. Its next partnership with a Dutch company was more effective, supposedly because of the greater compatibility with the Dutch. But in the first partnership, the companies set up many â€Å"dealbusters†[12], from letting lawyers negotiate for executives, to ignoring assumptions about future business strategy. In the second case, they learned from their mistakes and changed the way they worked with their partner. National cultures had little to do with failure in the first instance and success in the second. Cultural value issues – and issues of â€Å"difference† in general – are more apparent at early stages of relationships than later, before people came to know each other more holistically. And outsiders of any kind, even from the next neighbourhood, can seem different. But once people get to know each other beyond first impressions, relationship dynamics are often determined by power rather than culture. Resistance to the new American chief executive of a British retailer was resistance to change, not to culture differences.National culture issues were simply one more piece of learning as he moved from outsider to insider; they did not affect his ability to do his work of managing a fast and successful turnaround[13]. ? Central country value tendencies are often reported at a very high level of generality, as on average over large populations themselves far from homogeneous. Thus, they fail to apply to many groups and individuals within those countries. There are strong individual, regional, and ethnic differences within countries that are masked by the attempt to find country patterns.For example, an American who had served in Japan during the Second World War liked the docile women he saw there. He decided to marry a Japanese woman, only to discover after the marriage that she came from the one part of Japan that encouraged assertive, dominant women. And not only are there individual as well as ethnic differences wi thin countries, but individuals themselves derive their behaviour from many influences and can hold multiple identities. The chairman of Matra Hachette in Paris calls himself â€Å"a Gascon, a Frenchman, and a European†. Finally, group cultural tendencies are always more apparent from outside than inside the group. Indeed, people often only become aware of their own value or culture in contrast to someone perceived as an outsider[6]. The British writer George Orwell observed that national identity and cultural similarity is salient only for those returning from abroad or when the country is threatened; otherwise, people hold firmly to their individuality and are more aware of differences among those within the same nation.For these reasons, then, we wondered about the circumstances under which cross-cultural interaction would affect business performance. The Foreign Acquisitions Study To learn more about managerial issues provoked by cultural differences, we looked for situat ions in which cross-cultural interactions might produce organizational tensions. Kanter’s studies of international strategic alliances and joint ventures, reported in a series of Harvard case studies and articles[14], had uncovered a large number of strains between cross-border partners, but most of Cultural Differences 7Journal of Management Development 13,2 8 these involved strategic, organizational, political, or financial issues. But perhaps that was because the relationship between venture or alliance partners is assumed to be one of relative equality and independence; each partner retains its own cultural identity as well as control over its own operations, co-operating with the other for limited purposes while insulating core activities from the relationship. We looked for another test in the realm of foreign acquisitions, in which cultural differences would perhaps play a greater role.Foreign acquisitions of US companies increased over the last decade. In 1990, 446 su ch deals, valued at $46. 2 billion, were completed, compared with only 126 deals valued at $4. 6 billion in 1982. Foreign acquisitions of US companies accounted for 28. 1 per cent of the total value of merger and acquisition activity involving at least one company in 1990, compared with only 7. 6 per cent in 1982[15]. This acquisition situation, we proposed, would heighten American managers’ awareness of their own culture and its contrast to the acquirer’s culture, as they merged operations or shifted control over decisions.Since American companies were more accustomed to acquiring foreign operations than being acquired, the â€Å"reversal of roles† experienced when being acquired would perhaps exaggerate tensions enough to bring cultural issues to the surface. Therefore, we developed a pilot project with eight companies. T he Companies Approximately 75 interviews with senior and middle managers were conducted by Harvard Business School teams in 1992 and 1993 at eight mid-sized New England-based American companies which had been acquired by foreign companies in the period between mid-1987 and 1990 (with one exception acquired in 1984).All companies had enough experience with the foreign parent to provide time for cross-cultural contact to occur and any problems to surface; but the acquisition was also recent enough for managers to have fresh memories. The circumstances surrounding the acquisitions differed in some respects. One was a strictly arms-length financial investment in which a well-known sporting goods manufacturer was acquired by a Venezuelan financial group as its only US holding in a leveraged buyout from investors who had acquired it two years earlier; as long as profits were high, there was minimal contact with the parent.In two other cases, there was a history of relationships between the foreign parent and the acquired company prior to the acquisition: a familyowned retailer had developed a business partnership with a large r but also family-owned British chain four years before the acquisition as part of a succession plan; and a metals manufacturer had formed a number of joint ventures with a Japanese conglomerate beginning seven years before the acquisition, turning to its Japanese partner as a defensive tactic against a hostile takeover threat.Other acquisitions also stemmed from financial distress: an armaments manufacturer was bought by a British conglomerate after the US company faltered under a sequence of four different American owners; an abrasives manufacturer was bought by a French company as a â€Å"white knight† in a takeover battle with a British company; and a US retailer was sold to a Japanese retailer when it no longer fit its US manufacturing company parent’s strategy. In many of the cases, then, foreign acquirers were sought by the US companies to solve a problem.Two of the companies, given the pseudonyms Metalfab and Hydrotech, were observed by the second author in par ticular depth. Both were engineeringoriented manufacturing companies with operations primarily in the US and annual sales between $100 and $200 million. Both were previously owned by financially-troubled US parents whose core business was in a different industry, and both were bought by well-respected, internationally-experienced companies in the same industry.Corn conducted 30 interviews at Metalfab, a manufacturer of fabricated metal products acquired about five years earlier by Fabritek, pseudonym for a Swedish manufacturer in the same business. He also conducted 21 interviews at Hydrotech, a designer and manufacturer of hydraulic systems acquired about three years earlier by Gruetzi, pseudonym for a German-Swiss manufacturer of industrial energy systems.But while Metalfab was acquired by a company of similar size and was operating at a pretax profit, Hydrotech’s new parent was much larger and more diversified geographically and technologically, and Hydrotech was accumulat ing significant losses. Cultural Differences 9 Overview of the Findings The interviews at all eight companies focused on the history of the companies’ relationships, their business situations and business strategies, the amount and kind of cross-cultural contact between managers, difficulties and how they had been resolved, and any organizational changes which had come about as a result of the merger.We expected cultural differences to play a prominent role in the dynamics of the integration, especially because so many questions probed these issues specifically – from asking for characterizations of â€Å"typical† American and parent country managers to comparing managerial styles in concrete situations. (The study was thus â€Å"biased† towards finding cultural differences and tensions because of them. ) We expected many difficulties to arise, necessitating many organizational changes, and we expected American companies to resist learning from their fore ign company parents.We also expected some combinations to be more volatile than others, such as the Japanese-American interactions, either because of prejudice or because of values and style differences. We found, instead, that nationality-based culture was one of the less significant variables affecting the integration of the companies and their organizational effectiveness. We found that relatively few issues or problems arose which could be labelled â€Å"cultural†, even though managers were able to identify style differences easily that fit common cultural patterns.We also found that very few measures were taken to facilitate cultural integration. Only a moderate number of difficulties were encountered or organizational changes Journal of Management Development 13,2 10 necessitated, and US companies learned from their foreign parents. Furthermore, there was no discernable pattern of cultural compatibility; all nationalities worked well with their American acquisitions. In general, mergers and acquisitions create significant stress on organizational members, as separate organizational cultures and strategies are blended, ven within one country[12]. Differences in national cultures are assumed to add another layer of complexity to the merger process. But our findings suggest that contextual factors play the dominant role in determining the smoothness of the integration, the success of the relationship, and whether or not cultural differences become problematic. These findings lead us to conclude that the significance of cultural differences between employees or managers of different nationalities has been overstated.Cultural values or national differences are used as a convenient explanation for other problems, both interpersonal and organizational, such as a failure to respect people, group power and politics, resentment at subordination, poor strategic fit, limited organizational communication, or the absence of problem-solving forums. Such differen ces are invoked as explanations for the uncomfortable behaviour of others when people have limited contact or knowledge of the context behind the behaviour.Culture versus Context as an Explanatory Factor Most interviewees were able to identify a number of ways in which they differed â€Å"culturally† from their foreign colleagues in values, interpersonal style, and organizational approach. Many of these â€Å"fit† the position of countries on dimensions Hofstede[1] identified, especially power distance and individualism/ collectivism. The first difference issue mentioned, however, was an objective one: Language problems. A majority of Americans found the difficulty in overcoming language differences with all but the British acquirers to be the biggest â€Å"negative† surprise of their respective mergers.One American at Metalfab stated that â€Å"during initial meetings, we assumed that when we spoke English to the Swedes and they nodded their heads, they unders tood what we were saying. Now we realize the nods only meant that they heard the words†. Employees at Metalfab and Hydrotech also recalled meetings in which their foreign colleagues would agree to adopt some new procedure, â€Å"only to go right back to doing things the same old way as soon as they left the meeting†. American employees noted cultural differences in decision-making styles.Many argued that their foreign parents’ management team took a longer-term view. Americans at Hydrotech and Metalfab routinely expressed frustration with the unwillingness of German-Swiss and Swedish managers to make decisions without a great deal of analysis. Europeans noted the American reputation for fast, less thoughtful decisions. A British manager involved in the armaments company acquisition said, â€Å"Unlike American companies which manage by quarterly numbers, we at UK headquarters base our strategy and business policies on long-term positioning†.American intervi ewees also identified a number of differences in interpersonal style between themselves and their foreign colleagues which they attributed to national culture. The Swiss were described as â€Å"very orderly and efficient†, the Swedes were universally described as being very serious. British managers were described as less emotional, less community-oriented, more deliberate, and much less likely to â€Å"shoot from the hip† than Americans. Europeans were described by nearly all American employees as being more formal, less open and outgoing, and slower to form friendships than are Americans.Japanese managers were described as very courteous and polite. Several Metalfab employees stated that the Swedes were much more likely to argue with each other publicly than were Americans. One American official recalled that in the early days of the merger, he and an American colleague would stare at each other in board meetings while the Swedes argued among themselves. The American manager claimed that his American colleagues would have been much more likely to discuss such differences privately.The Swedes were also described as having less respect for authority and greater willingness to confront their superiors publicly than are Americans – signs of low power distance in Hofstede’s terms. Other employees stated that Swedish managers are not as â€Å"results-oriented† as Americans when it comes to running meetings, ending meetings without a resolution or an understanding of the next steps. Swedes were described by several American employees as very critical, both of themselves and others.One American manager stated that â€Å"Americans are taught that it is more constructive to give pats on the back than to focus entirely on shortcomings as the Swedes are inclined to do†. In short, most of those interviewed found differences between themselves and their foreign colleagues to be clearly identifiable and immediately noticeable follo wing their respective mergers. Employees attributed a majority of these differences to national culture. But a closer analysis of these responses reveals a tendency for employees to attribute to culture differences which are more situationally-driven.For example, several employees stated the Swedes were unwilling or incapable of adjusting their planning and forecasting assumptions in light of changes in the environment, that the Swedes were more determined than are Americans, to meet old budget targets. This may reflect the fact that as parent, the Swedes and German-Swiss have the ultimate responsibility for financial results. Similarly, slower decision making may reflect the fact that the Swedish parent involves more people in the decision-making process than does its American subsidiary.Of course, the use of greater participation may itself reflect differences in values between Americans and Swedes, but it may also reflect differences in the organizational culture of parent and su bsidiary or in country-specific industry practices. Senior managers generally had more direct contact with the foreign parent and thus more contextual information. They were much more likely to identify differences in business context that explained apparent differences in â€Å"cultural values†. Senior executives at the American retailer acquired by a British company attributed differences in management practices to differences inCultural Differences 11 Journal of Management Development 13,2 12 business environments in the US and UK. For example, the British company appeared to be less interested in people and more interested in facilities. But this was because its operating expenses tended to be weighted more towards rent than to labour, because British supermarkets were typically located in expensive urban areas, whereas in the US supermarkets were generally found outside the commercial core of the city, and US chains had unions which drove up labour costs.There was also a tendency for American employees to attribute interpersonal difficulties with foreign colleagues to cultural differences without recognizing that Americans act in much the same way. There are recent public examples of American board meetings interrupted by public bickering. The popularity of the view that committees rarely accomplish anything similarly attests to the fact that Europeans are not the only ones who have difficulty establishing clear agendas in their meetings.Finally, in the US, American employees frequently complain about superiors who rarely hand out constructive criticism. In sum, Americans were routinely able to identify a number of differences between themselves and their foreign colleagues, but the attribution of these differences to nationality often seemed to be misdirected. Additionally, in many cases, these differences are more suggestive of perception than of reality. Perhaps it was more convenient to attribute differences to culture than to context because o f the popularity of national character stereotypes.The role of national stereotypes was made clear in contrasting what American managers said about their own foreign acquirers (whom they knew well) compared with other nationalities (which they knew less well). An American senior executive at the sporting goods manufacturer had highly positive things to say about his Venezuelan parent, calling Venezuelans â€Å"lovable, amiable, showing a high degree of concern for people†. In contrast, he said, â€Å"The companies you do not want to have take you over are the Germans and the Japanese. They feel they know how to do it better and just come in and take over†.But the companies in our study acquired by Japanese and German-Swiss parents reported just the opposite – that the Japanese, for example, were eager to learn from the American companies they acquired. In short, the greater the experience with managers from another country, the less reliance on negative stereoty pes. Furthermore, while many interviewees were able to identify behavioural style differences between American managers and their foreign parents, they also spoke of cultural compatibilities in values, business strategies, and organizational approach. Such similarities overrode style differences.Both retailers in the pilot study, for example, spoke of the common concerns and philosophies they shared with their foreign parent – one Japanese, one British. Finally, just because people could point to differences, that did not mean that the differences had operational consequences. Interviewees were asked to assess the extent to which cross-cultural differences created difficulties in the relationship between parent and subsidiary. Interestingly, many employees felt that although differences exist between their cultures, such differences did not create significant problems for employees.This finding cuts to the heart of this study’s central question: if cultural differences between a parent and subsidiary do not necessarily lead to significant inter-organizational conflict, what factors moderate the relationship between cultural heterogeneity and organizational conflict? Why do American employees of foreign companies feel that cultural differences between their own firm and their foreign parent have not been particularly problematic? Here, our findings suggest that a number of contextual factors act as mediators in determining whether or not these differences will be problematic.Contextual Factors as Key Determinants of Cros s-cultural Relationship Succes s Six factors emerged in the pilot study that accounted for the ease with which the merger was implemented and the relatively few difficulties attributed to national cultural differences: (1) the desirability of the relationship, especially in contrast to recent experiences of the acquired companies; (2) business compatibility between the two companies, especially in terms of industry and organizatio n; (3) the willingness of the acquirer to invest in the continued performance of the acquiree and to allow operational autonomy while performance improved; (4) mutual respect and communication based on that respect; (5) business success; and (6) the passage of time. Cultural Differences 13 Relationship Desirability The first issue sets the stage for whether the relationship begins with a positive orientation. When people are in distress, poorly-treated in previous relationships, have had positive experiences with their foreign rescuer, and play a role in initiating relationship discussions, they are much more likely to view the relationship as desirable and work hard to accommodate to any differences in cultural style so that the relationship succeeds. First, almost all of the companies in the pilot study were acquired by foreigners after a period of financial distress.A Hydrotech employee said, â€Å"Everyone here was aware of the firm’s financial problems at the time of th e acquisition. News of the purchase was viewed favourably. Gruetzi kept our doors from being padlocked. Everyone recognized that without Gruetzi, Hydrotech might not have made it†. While Metalfab did not have Hydrotech’s financial problems at the time of its acquisition, its employees took comfort from Fabritek’s strong financial condition at the time of the takeover. The abrasives company was rescued by its French acquirer as a â€Å"white knight in a takeover battle†. In all these cases, people were thus more likely to view their Journal of Management Development 13,2 14 acquirers as saviours than villains. Cultural problems were therefore not problematic.When asked to describe their initial reaction to the acquisitions, interviewees in several companies began with a description of how difficult life had been under its former parent. Several foreign parents in our study therefore compared favourably with each subsidiary’s former US parents. Hydrot ech and Metalfab’s former parents had neither understood the business of its subsidiary nor shown any desire to invest in their subsidiary’s long-term growth. The armaments company had four recent owners, several of whom stripped corporate assets and art collections, an experience one manager referred to as being â€Å"raped†. Under new owners who cared about them, employees were therefore more inclined to tolerate and adapt to cultural differences.In other cases, national differences were not a problem because the US and non-US companies had spent several years getting to know each other through joint ventures. The British retailer and the Japanese conglomerate had long worked closely with the American companies they eventually bought. Nearly every respondent at Metalfab and Hydrotech spoke with high regard for their parent’s technical expertise, manufacturing skill, knowledge of the international marketplace, and reputation for quality. As one employee commented, â€Å"Our concerns about the takeover were quickly put to rest. After all, Gruetzi was not an unknown quantity. They were an industry leader and we had worked with them on several projects in the past†.In contrast, respondents who were less familiar with the operations of their acquirer appear to have been the most concerned and apprehensive about the news of the merger when it was first announced. As one employee recalled, â€Å"At first I was sickened by the announcement, but when I saw Fabritek’s product line and the obvious potential for synergy, I became extremely excited†. Several respondents also mentioned that if the acquirer had a reputation for dismantling its acquisitions, they would have been far less sanguine about the takeover and the possibilities for success. Reputation was based not only on past direct experience but also on assumptions about how â€Å"companies like that† behaved. One Metalfab employee claimed that compared wi th other countries, â€Å"the Swedes are just like us†.The conventional wisdom at Metalfab was that Scandinavian firms had a history of keeping their acquisitions intact. Finally, the ability to choose made a difference. In several cases, the companies themselves initiated the search for a foreign partner. The element of surprise that creates anxiety and uncertainty was missing. A Hydrotech employee stated: â€Å"We wanted to be sold; I viewed the announcement as a real positive – someone wanted to buy us! † Business Compatibility Organizational similarities were more important to most companies than national cultural differences. At the time of their respective mergers, employees of Metalfab, Hydrotech, and both retailers in the study took immediate comfort rom the fact that their new acquirers were in the same industry as they, especially the retailer sold by an American manufacturer to a Japanese retailer. As one Hydrotech employee stated: â€Å"Our former p arent showed no commitment to, or interest in, our business. Now, there is a much better fit†. Another employee stated: â€Å"Everyone was initially apprehensive about the takeover but at least we were bought by a company which understands and cares about our business. This turned our initial apprehension into excitement†. Along similar lines, Metalfab employees reacted very favourably to the news that â€Å"a metal company was purchasing a metal company†.Organizational similarity meant that employees could feel that they play important roles in carrying out their parent’s strategy and believe that their parent values their contribution. As one Hydrotech employee stated: â€Å"Despite the fact that Gruetzi is a much larger company than our former parent was, it is easier to see how we fit into their plans†. Thus, at both Hydrotech and Metalfab, the benefits of the merger were transparent to employees. As one manager stated, â€Å"This was an easy a nnouncement to make; the merger spoke for itself†. Employees at Hydrotech and Metalfab felt that sharing a common technical orientation with their parent allowed both rganizations to more easily overcome national differences. Several employees emphasized what a pleasure it was to work with a parent organization that understands the business they are in. As one engineer stated, â€Å"our two firms are like twins that were separated at birth†. Employees at both Hydrotech and Metalfab also feel that their parents’ expertise and credibility in the industry has made it easier to accept them in the role of acquirer. One Metalfab employee’s comment captured the attitude of the firm’s employees towards foreign ownership when he claimed: â€Å"It doesn’t bother me in the least that our parent is a foreign company because we speak the same language, Metal! A majority of those interviewed concluded that they would now prefer being taken over by a forei gn company in the same business than by an American firm in a different industry. Cultural Differences 15 Investment without Interference Of all the actions taken by a foreign partner, none seems to have a more positive impact on morale and on attitudes towards foreigners than a foreign owner’s decision to invest capital in its subsidiaries. Fabritek spent $11 to 12 million upgrading the production facilities of its US subsidiary during each of the first two years following the acquisition and has invested an additional $6 to 8 million annually ever since.Gruetzi has similarly invested in new equipment for Hydrotech’s Ohio production facility. To most American employees, such investment demonstrated that its new parent was committed to the company’s long-term health. When investment was accompanied by operational autonomy, the relationship was viewed very favourably and cross-cultural tensions minimized. In three cases – sporting goods manufacturer acquir ed by a Venezuelan company and both the retailer and the manufacturer acquired by Japanese companies – feeling lack of cultural tensions was a function of the Journal of Management Development 13,2 16 minimal interference of the foreign company in its new US operations. â€Å"They et us do what we are good at†, said an executive at the sporting goods firm, â€Å"which is make money†. Employees at Hydrotech and Metalfab were surprised by the extent to which their parents allowed them to manage their own operations. As one Hydrotech employee stated: â€Å"Things have turned out much better than I originally expected. Gruetzi has not overmanaged us, they kept our management team intact, and we have not been forced to spend a lot of our time defending ourselves†. Metalfab employees were similarly pleased that their parent has allowed the firm to retain day-to-day control: â€Å"While our parent provides us with suggestions, they have allowed us to run the sh ow here†.We argue that American employees are less likely to view cultural heterogeneity as a problem when foreign management allows such autonomy along with adding resources. It should be pointed out that complete autonomy was not welcomed by all employees; a minority of employees (those dissatisfied with their firm’s policies) mentioned that they would be happier if the parent took a more active role in managing its subsidiary. At least one Hydrotech engineer wished that Gruetzi would force the company to standardize its designs and acquire better tools for its engineers to work with. At Metalfab, several employees expressed disappointment that its parent had not prevented the company from moving operations to Mexico.Furthermore, that high degrees of autonomy have possibly slowed down the speed with which the merged organizations develop a common culture. Several Metalfab employees reported that it has been difficult to â€Å"pull our two families together and get th e message out to customers that we are one firm†. Still, for the Americans autonomy generally meant that they did not feel foreigners were imposing â€Å"foreign ways† on them, which made them more tolerant of differences rather than resistant to them. Open Communication and Mutual Respect Nearly all interviewees agreed that open communication and showing mutual respect are critical to developing trust and ensuring a successful partnership.One retailer, for example, felt that its new Japanese parent wanted to learn from American practice, which made them feel valued and made rapport with the Japanese easy to develop. Tensions occurred, in contrast, when foreign colleagues did not show respect for American technology and expertise. At Fabritek, Swedish engineers and marketing personnel initially viewed Metalfab’s traditional, composite products as inferior to their own, all-metal product, which required tighter engineering and manufacturing tolerances in order to ensure a perfect seal. As a result, Americans said that the Swedes saw themselves as â€Å"the real engineers† in the company. But note here that the tensions were caused by technical differences, not cultural ones. ) Similarly, Hydrotech engineers described their German-Swiss colleagues as very arrogant and protective about Gruetzi’s products; there was a feeling that Hydrotech engineers should not â€Å"tamper† with their parent’s designs. Employee sensitivity to possible cultural differences played a significant role in reducing outbreaks of cross-cultural tension. One Hydrotech employee reasoned that cultural clashes had been avoided mainly because employees had been so concerned that such tensions could occur that they put more effort into trying to understand one another.Similar concerns led executives at Fabritek and Metalfab to schedule frequent meetings with each other soon after the merger; these meetings improved understanding and lessened tens ion between the two firms. Ironically, one senior American official recalled that he had rarely met with executives from the firm’s former US parent â€Å"even though they were located right down the road from the company†. Though formal cross-cultural training programmes were rare, open communication helped build relationships. Sensitivity to cultural differences and willingness to deal with problems directly minimized organizational tension. Cultural Differences 17 Business Success Nothing succeeds like success. People are willing to overlook cultural differences in relationships which bring clear benefits.But unsuccessful ventures produce squabbling even among people who are culturally similar. Creating opportunities for joint success between parent and subsidiary promotes acceptance of cross-cultural differences and creates support for the relationship. Several months before Hydrotech’s acquisition by Gruetzi, a company project had â€Å"gone sour† du e to a technical malfunction. After the merger, Hydrotech used Gruetzi’s technology to solve the problem. For the many employees who had suffered through the project’s difficulties, this single act sold the virtue of the partnership. Another Hydrotech employee stated: â€Å"We had not realized how quickly Gruetzi’s technology could be put to use.In only one year, our department was able to bid on two projects and win a $45 million contract†. Nothing could possibly send a more positive message about the benefits of partnership than winning business because of it. Ongoing financial performance affects the quality and nature of communications between parent and subsidiary, and thus plays a role in determining whether or not cultural differences are viewed as problematic. If success reduces tensions, deteriorating performance increases them. Employees noted that travel budgets came under increasing pressure during periods of poor performance, and thus, fewer meetings take place between American and foreign employees.In difficult times, communication between parent and subsidiary may deteriorate as employees in each organization focus on their own problems. Finally, poor performance leads to frustration, fingerpointing, and reduced trust. One Hydrotech manager noticed that as Gruetzi has encountered more financial difficulties, they became increasingly demanding of Hydrotech and focused more on the company’s short-term operating results than in the past. The Pas sage of Time Does time heal all wounds? Time, at least, reduces anxieties and replaces stereotypes with a more varied view of other people. The levels of cross-cultural Journal of Management Development 13,2 18 tension vary as a function of the stage in the relationship-building process.Anxieties at Hydrotech and Metalfab were highest during the days immediately following the announcement of each takeover. This initial anxiety declined as the merger entered a transition ph ase in which management showed reluctance to create conflict. Employees of both subsidiaries also reacted positively to foreign management’s willingness to discuss issues and listen to their concerns at that time. According to one employee, â€Å"these meetings made us feel good about the changes and made us realize how alike our philosophies were†. But during the transition phase, employees also underestimated the degree of cultural heterogeneity and the potential for conflict to erupt.As management began to focus on more substantive issues and the amount of communications between American and foreign employees grew, a new realization set in that the cultural differences between the two firms were greater than initially realized, which required more awareness and sensitivity to avoid conflict. It appears likely then, that employee perceptions of cross-cultural tension are affected by the passage of time and by the merger process itself. One might also expect that empl oyee attitudes towards cultural heterogeneity will change as Americans and foreign employees work together and become more familiar with each others’ customs and values. Mistrust is always more likely at early stages of relationships.People at Hydrotech and Metalfab felt their new foreign parents were particularly guarded in discussing their technology during the first months together. As one employee mentioned: â€Å"It was like playing poker during the first year. You always got an answer to your question but the question was answered as narrowly as possible – even when, by withholding information, the answer was misleading†. But another engineer recognized the significance of sharing technology noting that â€Å"when our parent provides us with technology, they are giving us their life’s work†. T he Negative Side of Cross-cultural Interaction: T hreat and Prejudice Positive views of the relationship between US company and foreign parent predomin ated, but they were not universal in the companies studied.Top management and those with the greatest day-to-day contact were most likely to be favourable. Those at lower ranks anxious about the implications for their careers were more likely to express negative views, including prejudice and resentment, reacting the most nationalistically to the news of a foreign takeover. One American reported how â€Å"sick† he was over the fact that â€Å"this country is gradually being sold off to foreigners†. Some higher level managers commented that they would have been more comfortable if their acquirer had been American, but this preference did not seem to affect the relationship. A manager at the armaments company reported: â€Å"We would rather have been bought by a US company.There is an element of national pride, especially in our industry. We are very patriotic. There is no one in the company that would say we are a British firm. We all wear and buy ‘made in USAâ⠂¬â„¢ products†. Still, nationalist sentiments did not prevent this manager from declaring the relationship a success and identifying very few crosscultural problems. The most significant factor in determining employee reactions to acquisition was self-interest: how the change would affect their own standing in the firm. Virtually all interviewees reacted to news of the acquisition with the same question: â€Å"How will this impact on my career in this organization? †.Those employees who were most likely to suffer a loss of prestige or power, or who had reason to feel threatened by the mergers were most likely to react unfavourably to it. However, the fact that the vast majority of employees in both companies did not react in this way attests to just how apparent the benefits of these mergers were to most employees. Therefore threat could work both ways; if the foreign company improved performance, jobs would be saved. A manager at the armaments company observed,  "The community and employees understand there are differences between us and the British. But for them, having good jobs is more valuable. When corporate survival is at stake, people cannot afford to have culture become an issue†.Attitudes were shaped by symbolic acts taken by the foreign parents as much as by more substantive actions. One Metalfab employee recalled the day that Fabritek’s president arranged to have group photographs taken of all employees in the US so that they could be shown to people back in Sweden. â€Å"Fabritek immediately impressed me as a very people-oriented company†. The Attribution of Organizational Problems to National Culture Our findings suggest, then, that contextual factors act to either fan the flames of intergroup conflict and cross-cultural polarization or encourage organizational members to accept these differences. In the pilot study, organizational and technical compatibilities overwhelm cultural differences.Cultural differe nces thus seem to be a residual category to which people attribute problems in the absence of a supportive context. Cultural differences do not automatically cause tensions. But when tensions do arise – often due to situational factors such as lack of communication or poor performance – people blame many of the organizational difficulties they encounter on cultural heterogeneity – on the presence of others who seem different – rather than to the context within which these problems took place. This view is consistent with Chris Argyris’s perspective on defensive routines in organizations[16]. Why do people blame culture for problems and scribe differences between their own behaviour and that of their foreign colleagues to dispositional factors (the kind of people they are) rather than to situational factors (the organizational context)? First, cultural heterogeneity presents a conspicuous target for employees to point at when looking for an explanat ion for their problems. Such differences are readily apparent in early stages of contact between people who differ in a visible way, such as race, gender, or language, especially when there are only a few â€Å"tokens† such as expatriate managers among many â€Å"locals†[6]. Pre- Cultural Differences 19 Journal of Management Development 13,2 20 onceived notions and prejudices which employees bring into the evaluative process increase the likelihood that people will attribute behaviour to nationality. In-group favouritism is evoked in situations of cross-cultural contact. Research has shown that people want to favour members of their own group (the in-group) over others. Motivational theorists hold that self-esteem is enhanced if people value their own group and devalue other groups[17,18]. Such favouritism leads to a set of cognitive biases which reinforce the distinction between in-group and out-group members. People expect in-group members to display more desirable a nd fewer undesirable behaviours than out-group members[19].As a result, people are more likely to infer negative dispositions from undesirable and out-group behaviours than from undesirable in-group behaviours, and are less likely to infer positive dispositions from desirable outgroup behaviours than from desirable in-group behaviours[20-23]. Furthermore, people tend to remember behaviour which is congruent with their expectations over behaviour which is inconsistent with their views[24,25]. Thus, memories reinforce in-group favouritism as well. In-group biases are especially likely to form when individuals identify strongly with their group and when in-group members view other groups as a threat[17]. During an acquisition process, employees who work for, and identify with their company for many years suddenly find that another firm, with its own culture vision, values, and ways of doing things is responsible for their future.Cross-border mergers offer a particularly favourable envi ronment for such biases to develop because group membership is clearly defined by national as well as organizational boundaries. At both Hydrotech and Metalfab, in-group favouritism and cognitive biases may have been the driving forces behind the tendency among Americans to attribute wrongfully â€Å"bad news† to their foreign parent (i. e. out-group members). In one case, Hydrotech management had frozen salaries and extended the required working week from 40 to 44 hours after the merger in an effort to â€Å"impress Gruetzi by showing a willingness to make a few difficult decisions†. Many Hydrotech junior employees attributed this unpopular policy to Gruetzi’s management.Ironically, according to one middlelevel manager, when Gruetzi found out about these changes, they gave Hydrotech’s president one month to reverse the policy. In another example, soon after Metalfab announced plans to transfer some of its manufacturing operations to Mexico, rumours began circulating on the factory floor that the Swedes were behind the decision. When senior management in the US found out about the rumours, the company’s president called a meeting with all employees and took full responsibility for the decision. But many blue-collar workers continued to blame the Swedes for this unpopular move. They also attributed the decision to downsize the American workforce to the company’s foreign parent.A second explanation for why cultural differences are inappropriately invoked is called the â€Å"fundamental attribution error†[26] – a tendency to attribute one’s own behaviour to the situation but others’ behaviour to their â€Å"character†. People attribute negative behaviour of foreign colleagues to their nationality or culture (dispositional factors) rather than to situational or contextual factors which are operating behind the scenes[27]. For example, Metalfab interviewees initially viewed their Swedish c olleagues as fractious (i. e. â€Å"the Swedes are a stubborn people†) before it occurred to them that language problems had caused many early misunderstandings.They attributed the fact that their Swedish colleagues were more engineering oriented and less marketing oriented to national biases (â€Å"Swedes design bulldozers for the kind of work a garden shovel could do†) rather than to differences in product features and to the requirements of the European market. For example, rigid engineering standards for Fabritek’s all-metal products required engineers in Sweden to play a more central role in the parent’s operations, whereas the competitiveness of the US market demanded that marketing personnel play a more critical role in US decision making. But those who had more direct contact with the foreign parent, such as senior managers, also had more contextual information and were less likely to make the â€Å"fundamental attribution error†.If in-grou p biases and the fundamental attribution error are behind the tendency to view cultural heterogeneity as problematic, what steps might management take to promote inter-organizational co-operation in cross-border mergers? Our findings suggest that actions which make the relationship desirable, reduce uncertainty, show respect for the other group, create communication channels, and ensure business success will encourage employees to identify with their foreign colleagues and view the company as one organization. Creating an atmosphere of mutual respect, promoting open communication, investing in the future, maximizing opportunities to experience joint success, and taking steps to familiarize employees with their counterpart’s products and markets reduce the likelihood that cultural differences will be viewed as a source of organizational tension.Conclusion These pilot study findings are only suggestive, of course. We have a small number of cases from one region. While none of t hem can yet be called a longterm success, they have survived a period of integration during which other companies which perhaps did experience debilitating cultural problems could have called off the marriage. We could be looking only at the â€Å"winners† that managed cultural differences well. Indeed, those companies experiencing problems were more likely to turn down our request to participate in the pilot study. But if tilted towards successes, then this research points to some of the circumstances that contribute to successful cross-cultural relationships.And since we â€Å"biased† the interviews towards identification of cultural differences and cultural tensions, the relative absence of tension gives additional weight to our argument that contextual and situational factors, such as technical fit, business performance, and abundant communication, are more significant determinants of relationship effectiveness. Cultural Differences 21 Journal of Management Develop ment 13,2 22 Employees at each of the companies studied were able to identify a number of cultural differences between their own organization and that of their parent. Nevertheless, few employees viewed cultural heterogeneity as a significant source of tension in their firm. Such findings lend support to the notion that national cultural differences do not necessarily increase the amount of tension between organizations or make partnerships among companies from different countries untenable.This article proposes that there are a number of factors which help to determine how employees react to foreign ownership. It calls into question the assumption that the larger the social distance or cultural gap between the national cultures of two merged organizations, the greater will be the potential for strain in the relationship between employees. The findings from our pilot study suggest contextual factors are extremely important mediators in crosscultural relationships. These factors infl uence how cultural differences are interpreted and whether they are viewed by employees as problematic. Indeed, they may even determine whether â€Å"cultural differences† are identified at all. References 1. Hofstede, G. Cultures and Organization, McGraw-Hill, New York, NY, 1991. 2. Kanter, R. M. , â€Å"Transcending Business Boundaries: 12,000 World Managers View Change†, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 69, May-June 1991. 3. Hampden-Turner, C. , â€Å"The Boundaries of Business: Commentaries from the Experts†, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 69, September-October 1991. 4. Lodge, G. C. and Vogel, E. F. (Eds), Ideology and National Competitiveness: An Analysis of Nine Countries, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA, 1987. 5. Kanter, R. M. , Applbaum, K. and Yatsko, P. , FCB and Publicis ( A ): Forming the Alliance, Harvard Business School Case Records, Boston, MA, 1993. 6. Kanter, R. M. Men and Women of the Corporation, Basic Books, New York, NY, 1977. 7. Westn ey, E. , Imitation and Innovation: T he Transfer of Western Organizational Patterns to Meiji, Japan, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987. 8. Starbuck, W. H. , â€Å"Learning by Knowledge-intensive Firms†, Journal of M anagement Studies, Vol. 29 No. 6, 1992, pp. 713-40. 9. Haire, M. , Ghiselli, E. E. and Porter, L. W. , Managerial T hinking, Wiley, New York, NY, 1966. 10. Wuthnow, R. and Shrum, W. , â€Å"Knowledge Workers as a ‘New Class’: Structural and Ideological Convergence among Professional-Technical Workers and Managers†, Work and Occupations, Vol. 10, 1983, pp. 471-87. 11. Myers, P. and Kanter, R. M. Inmarsat 1991 , Harvard Business School Case Records, Boston, MA, 1992. 12. Kanter, R. M. , When Giants Lea r n to Dance: M aster ing the Challenges of S trategy, Management, and Careers in the 1990s, Simon and Schuster, New York, NY, 1989. 13. Kanter, R. M. and Gabriel, L. , BhS ( A ): Opening Boundaries, Harvard Business School Case Records , Boston, MA, 1992. 14. Kanter, R. M. , â€Å"Competing on Relationships: How Companies Build Collaborative Advantage†, Harvard Business Review, May-June 1994. 15. M& A Almanac, Vol. 26 No. 6, 1992, p. 54. 16. Argyris, C. , Overcoming Organizational Defenses: Facilitating Organizational Learning, Allyn & Bacon, Boston, MA, 1990. 17. Tajfel, H. and Turner, J. C. â€Å"An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict†, in Austin, W. S. and Worchel, S. (Eds), T he S ocial Psychology of Intergroup Relations , Brooks/Cole, Monterey, CA, 1979, pp. 33-47. 18. Turner, J. C. , Rediscovering the Social Group: A S elf-categorization T heory, Blackwell, Oxford, 1987. 19. Howard, J. W. and Rothbart, M. , â€Å"Social Categorization and Memory for In-group and Outgroup Behavior, Jour nal of Personal ity and S ocial Psychology , Vol. 38 No. 2, 1980, pp. 301-10. 20. Taylor, D. M. and Jaggi, V. , â€Å"Ethnocentrism and Causal Attribution in a South Indian Context†, Journal of Cros s Cultural Psychology, Vol. 5 No. 2, 1974, pp. 162-71. 21. Allen, V. L. and Wilder, D. A. â€Å"Categorization, Belief Similarity, and Intergroup Discrimination†, Jour nal of Personal ity and S ocial Psychology , Vol. 32 No. 6, 1975, pp. 971-7. 22. Allen, V. L. and Wilder, D. A. , â€Å"Group Categorization and Attribution of Belief Similarity†, Small Group Behavior, Vol. 10 No. 1, 1979, pp. 73-80. 23. Pettigrew, T. F. , â€Å"The Ultimate Attribution Error: Extending Allport’s Cognitive Analysis of Prejudice†, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 5 No. 4, 1979, pp. 461-76. 24. Hastie, R. and Kumar, P. A. , â€Å"Person Memory: Personality Traits as Organizing Principles in Memory for Behavior†, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 37 No. 1, 1979, pp. 25-38. 25. Srull, T. D. Lichtenstein, M. and Rothbart, M. , â€Å"Associative Storage and Retrieval Processes in Person Memory†, Jour nal of E xper imental Psychology: L ea r ning, M emor y and Cognition, Vol. 11 No. 2, 1985, pp. 316-45. 26. Ross, L. , â€Å"The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process†, in Berkowitz, L. (Ed. ), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 10, Academic Press, New York, NY, 1977, pp. 173-220. 27. Jones, E. E. and Nisbett, R. E. , â€Å"The Actor and the Observer: Divergent Perceptions of the Causes of Behavior†, in Jones, E. E. , Kanouse, D. E. , Kelley, H. H. , Nisbett, R. E. , Valins, S. and Weiner, B. Eds), Perceiving the Causes of Behavior , General Learning Press, Morristown, NJ, 1971, pp. 79-94. Further Reading Locksley, A. , Ortiz, V. and Hepburn, C. , â€Å"Social Categorization and Discriminatory Behavior: Extinguishing the Minimal Intergroup Discrimination Effect†, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 39 No. 5, 1980, pp. 773-83. Maass, A. , Salvi, D. , Arcuri, L. and Semin, G. , â€Å"Language Use in Intergroup Contexts: T he Linguistic Intergroup Bias†, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 57 No. 6, 1989, pp. 981-93. Tajfel, H. , â€Å"Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations†, Annual Review of Psychology, Annual Reviews, Stanford, CA, 1982, pp. 1-39. Cultural Differences 23